AN

APPEAL

TO THE

Senſe of the People,

ON THE

Preſent Poſture of Affairs.

WHEREIN

The Nature of the late Treaties are inquired into, and the Conduct of the M---i---y with Regard to *M--n--ca*, *A--r--ca*, &c. is conſidered;

WITH

Some REMARKS upon the Light in which theſe, and other Publick Affairs have been lately repreſented.

LONDON:
Printed for DAVID HOOKHAM, in Pater-noſter Row.
MDCCLVI.

[Price One Shilling.]

AN

APPEAL

TO THE

Sanity of the People,

ON THE

Present Posture of Affairs.

WITH

The Nature of the late Treaties are inquired into, and the Conduct of the M——y with Regard to M——co, A——a, &c. is considered;

WITH

Some Reasons upon the Light in which their, and other Foreign Affairs have been lately represented.

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AN

APPEAL

TO THE

Senſe of the People.

AT a Time when ſo much malevolent Induſtry is exerted, by Slander, by Libels, by Cabals, and by every evil Art, to inflame the Paſſions of the People, an Appeal to their Reaſon, an Attempt to introduce a Moment's cool Reflection, in Matters of ſuch Importance as thoſe we are now engaged in, and at a Time ſo critical, cannot be improper, and will not, I hope, be ineffectual.

There is no Man who feels for his Country, who does not moſt ſenſibly feel our late Loſs; and who is not touched with Indignation at the Diſgrace our Flag has ſuffered. Our Glory has been tarniſhed in its brighteſt Part; and the Reſentment we ſhew, the

Zeal we manifeſt, for a ſtrict Enquiry into the Offence, and for puniſhing the Offenders in a Manner adequate to their Offences, is not only juſt, but it is highly commendable.

But there are certain Inſtruments conſtantly at Work, who watch the Ebb and Flow of Affairs, and every little Change in the Minds of the People, that they may turn even our beſt Diſpoſitions to the publie Prejudice. Indeed, this much, in juſtice, muſt be allowed them; though their Arguments are the weakeſt imaginable, and their Deſigns as bad as their Arguments are weak, yet they underſtand perfectly well the Uſe of Conjunctures; they know how to *time* their Attacks in ſuch a Manner, that the moſt ſhallow Cavillings ſhall paſs for unanſwerable Arguments; the moſt groundleſs Conjectures for demonſtrated Truths; and their own Malice and Diſaffection for Patriotiſm. *Facili civitate ad accipenda credendaque omnia nova, cum triſtia ſunt*; for at a time when People's Minds are ſunk by any Misfortune, ill News chimes in with that Diſpoſition, and may be almoſt ſaid to be agreeable to it. Better Accounts and a more chearful Proſpect are a Sort of Diſappointments; and when we are ſoured with ill

News,

News, and exaſperated againſt a particular Perſon, it is not then difficult to puſh the Point farther; to beget Suſpicions, to ſow Rumours, to ſpread the Evil wide, and by Degrees to involve others in the Diſgrace who are entirely free from the Guilt, favoured by the Confuſion which attends indeterminate Accuſations, and the Proneneſs which Mankind, when enraged, naturally have to multiply the Objects of their Anger. This is natural; and of this Time, and the Diſpoſition it produced, an Advantage, and that of a very dangerous kind was taken by the Enemies of the public Tranquillity; to weaken our Confidence in each other; to take away all Strength from the Government, and to abate in the moſt ſhameful Manner the Reverence which thirty Years of the mildeſt and wiſeſt Government had juſtly given us for our moſt excellent Sovereign.

Theſe indeed were their Deſigns all along; but they are now ſo directly purſued; and in a manner ſo openly avowed, that their very Confidence of Succeſs may prevent it: they have ſprung their Mine too early, and without, I hope, hurting their Country, have diſcovered *Themſelves*.

This may promiſe a fairer Hearing to the diſpaſſionate Examination of the Meaſures which were taken for the general Good in this intereſting Conjuncture; I ſay, I hope, a fair Hearing, becauſe I am ſure I propoſe nothing but a fair Repreſentation of the Meaſures which were purſued; and I mean no other Defence of them, than what ſuch a plain Repreſentation of them ſhall furniſh. My Intention is to ſhew, in a plain and ſimple manner, the whole Scheme of our Operations, ſo far as a private Man may be ſuppoſed to comprehend it. I flatter myſelf, that when the whole Plan is laid together, all the Objections which have been raiſed to the detached Parts, and which never could have been raiſed were they not induſtriouſly ſeparated, ſhewn out of their natural Order, and confounded with other Things wholly foreign to them, will vaniſh of themſelves.

The very Excellence of any general and comprehenſive Syſtem may often be the Cauſe of particular Failures; but a wiſe and ſteady Miniſter, deſpiſing the little Criticks who feed upon little Faults, will keep his End conſtantly in View, and only regard what will be the capital Event on the *Total* of his Operations, without being diſturbed or thrown out of his Courſe, for any particular in-

independent Succeſſes the Enemy abroad may have, or the Advantages which the Enemy at home may derive from them.

Ill Succeſs in ſome Inſtances we undoubtedly have had; but I may confidently ſay, becauſe in its proper Place I can make, and ſhall make it appear, that they did not ariſe from the Plan which was purſued, and that we could not have taken any other Method to prevent it, beſides the Method that was taken, without deviating from Principles from which no Conſideration ſhould have obliged us to depart.

The Views for which we entered into this War are too generally underſtood to need any particular Explanation here. They chiefly regarded our Poſſeſſions in *America*: But though the Object be confined, the Operations neceſſary to attain it muſt be of a far more comprehenſive Nature; which makes it neceſſary to look towards our Situation in *Europe*, and to have an Eye on the Circumſtances of which this Situation gives us a Proſpect. In conſequence of both theſe, of our Deſigns in *America*, and of the Effects they muſt neceſſarily have upon our *European* Connections, the firſt Part of our Scheme, as I conceive, muſt have been

To

To bind down the Arms of *France* on the Continent, by a Chain of judicious Alliances.

Secondly, To cut off the Reſources of our Enemy, by deſtroying their Trade and ſeizing their Seamen.

Thirdly, To ſecure ourſelves from an Invaſion by a powerful Squadron in our own Ports; and at the ſame time to block up the *French* Navy in their Ports, to prevent more effectually their Deſigns either on *Ireland* or *America*.

Fourthly, To ſend ſuch a Force into *America* as might concluſively turn the Balance in that Part of the World in our Favour.

Theſe, I conceive, were the Grounds upon which our Adminiſtration intended to form the whole Fabric of their Deſigns; and if, as I ſuppoſe, very little can rationally be objected to the Ground-work, the Superſtructure will appear well built; and the whole taken together will make one entire well imagined Piece.

Convinced that the State of *Europe* is ſuch, that all its Parts are ſo interwoven by Commerce,

merce, by Alliances, by Marriages, by common Intereſts, and by mutual Jealouſies, that *England* and *France* can never be engaged in a War without engaging the moſt conſiderable Part of the reſt of *Europe* incidentally; that no ſuch thing as a partial War can be now expected, nor perphaps deſired by us—Our Miniſtry acted in Conformity to this Face of Things.

They examined early the Situation of *Europe*; they enquired into the Strength, the Connections, the Inclinations, and the Character of the ſeveral Powers.

To the Northward they had evidently but two Choices;—either to confirm our ancient Alliances with *Ruſſia*, or to project a new Alliance with *Sweden*.

With regard to the latter, the Work, had we undertaken it, would have been attended with infinite Difficulty; and if it could have been accompliſhed, would have been productive of nothing but Embarraſſment and Confuſion: To detach *Sweden* entirely from a *French* Intereſt would confeſſedly be a Work of Time, and much Trouble in the Management; and of much Uncertainty in the Event. Whether or no the Connexion with

with *France* be the real Intereſt of that Kingdom may be decided by ſpeculative Politicians at their Leiſure: But their long and almoſt hereditary Attachments to the Intereſt of *France*, the Eclat which this Alliance formerly had, and the general Prejudice which muſt have ariſen from this, would throw almoſt unſurmountable Bars in the Way of a Negotiation with that State: But grant that we could perfectly have ſucceeded in the Object of ſuch a Negotiation, and that *Sweden* were to declare heartily in our Favour, what could we expect from an Ally, of a Fidelity untried and unexperienced, but of Force lately tried and experienced to be very weak and ineffectual; of a Form of Government ſubjected to great Uncertainty of Counſels, and full of ſuch Seeds of the Fire of Faction and Sedition, that it wanted but the leaſt Spark of Opportunity to make it blaze out, and but the leaſt Breath of Encouragement to riſe to ſuch a Flame as muſt devour all the Good we could have expected from their ſincereſt and heartieſt Concurrence?

The other Side therefore was taken; and we treated with *Ruſſia*, our ancient and indeed natural Ally, of whoſe great Strength we had not the leaſt Reaſon to doubt. When this

this Alliance was formed, it was very natural to expect that a Counter-alliance muſt either have been formed or renewed againſt us. This, I ſay, was expected; but it was guarded againſt too; and the Miniſtry was conſcious, that having ſecured *Ruſſia* on our Side, all the Efforts made on the other muſt only add to that Security, muſt provoke, though inſufficient to alarm the Empire of the *Muſcovite*; which is of itſelf, but beyond all Doubt by our Aſſiſtance is more than ſufficient to overawe both *Sweden* and *Denmark*. Powers that for very obvious Reaſons, can hardly ever be cordially united; and if they ſhould unite, it muſt be by Ties weak and precarious, whilſt Jealouſy from within, and a formidable Power from without, by ſome promiſed Advantages, and by the Terror of its Arms, would be always ready to diſſolve the feeble Bands of ſuch a Confederacy; or if it ſhould fail of that, at leaſt to take away all Power of its operating to our Prejudice.

Affairs are ſo circumſtanced in that Part of the World, that a cloſe Alliance with one Party, naturally draws the Diſguſt of the other; and in this Caſe, what reaſonable Man would heſitate a Moment which Party to embrace? We did not in the leaſt heſitate to

ally with *Ruſſia*, foreſeeing indeed the Conſequences that would probably reſult from it in Counter-alliances; but ſecuring ourſelves againſt them by the Power of the Party we eſpouſed, and by the Meaſures which were wiſely and effectually taken to embarraſs *ſome other Powers*, and to find them Employment at home; convinced at the ſame time that nothing amongſt ourſelves could be objected to this Treaty, but ſuch Cavils as would have the very ſame Force, provided we left any one conſiderable State of *Europe* out of our Confederacy.

Whilſt we looked towards the North, we had nothing to fear from this Treaty; but we had other, and farther Views, wherein we had reaſon to hope from it no ſmall Advantages. The Conſequences of one prudent Step are never confined to the immediate ones.

The Alliance with *Ruſſia* was a fertile Alliance. What was the Reſult? Not what ſome prophetick Patriots, *in the Enthuſiaſm of their Policy*, had ſo confidently foretold. It did not force *Pruſſia* into the Arms of *France*. Quite contrary was the Effect; it influenced the Prudence of that great and wiſe Prince to detach himſelf entirely from *France*, and enter

enter into a ſtrict Alliance with our Court. If theſe Gentlemen indeed had adviſed him, he might probably have acted as they foretold; but providentially they were neither his nor our Counſellors.

His *Pruſſian* Majeſty has on Foot one of the moſt numerous, and by far the beſt diſciplined Army upon Earth: But it is the Man, it is the Character of the Prince himſelf, which is the great Gain we have in this Alliance; a Prince of the moſt penetrating Genius, of the moſt extenſive Views, and of the moſt active Diſpoſition; who underſtands the true Uſe of Opportunities, *knows them when they happen, and never fails to make the earlieſt and moſt effectual Uſe of them*; who weighs his Strength, and diſcerns juſt how far he ought to go in all his Projects; well informed of the moſt minute Parts of his own or his Neighbours Concerns, vigilant, brave, and enterpriſing; whoſe Buſineſs, whoſe Amuſements are military, and whoſe whole Dominions are a Sort of Camp. This Prince ſo ſituated, at the Head of ſuch a Body of Troops, and taking the Field, if Occaſion were, with a Reputation ſo eſtabliſhed, is a moſt valuable Acquiſition. If we have reſtored to him the Captures which were made in the laſt War, it was far from

relinquiſhing any Right we had claimed, as has been falſly ſuggeſted: If a Point is yielded by Favour, how far does that bind us from inſiſting rigidly on our Right upon other Occaſions, or from Parties we have not the ſame Reaſon to favour?—If I have taken my Neighbour's Cattle treſpaſſing on my Grounds and impounded them; but finding afterwards that I want his Friendſhip, I, on an Agreement with him, deliver up his Cattle and releaſe the Damages; will any one ſay this is giving up my Right? Or that he, and every Neighbour I have beſieds, may afterwards legally claim the ſame Indulgence at Pleaſure? And is it to be believed, that there are People among us who have the Folly to ſay we ought to have loſt this valuable Alliance, to have thrown this excellent Game out of our Hands *in a Pet*, rather than have made a Payment to the Amount of a few diſputed Captures, at a Time too when his *Pruſſian* Majeſty had five times their Value in Effects of this Nation abſolutely in his Power?

Having taken Notice of one ſo glaring a Piece of Abſurdity, it will be a Sort of Excuſe for mentioning one more, of the ſame Nature, and vented by the ſame Author; it is on the Subject of this Alliance. He is pleaſed to obſerve, that this Treaty is directly contrary to that we had made with *Ruſſia*; becauſe the

Ruſſians

Ruſſians have engaged to ſend Sixty Thouſand Men to the Aſſiſtance of *Great Britain*, which he concludes, and not improbably, were deſigned to ſerve in *Germany*; and that afterwards it was ſtipulated by the King of *Pruſſia*, that he would employ his Force to keep all Foreigners out of the Empire. This is the Subſtance of the Objection, which he has amplified without Meaſure, and ſpun out with a Thouſand Turnings and Windings, and Repetitions, *according to his vain Cuſtom.*

But the Solution is eaſy; and a little Explanation of the Deſign of theſe Treaties will effectually remove this, and all other Objections againſt them. As ſoon as the King of *Pruſſia* ſaw that we had entered into the *Ruſſian* Alliance, he was at no Loſs to divine our Motive to it. It regarded himſelf, and he was not long without coming to the Explanation we had moſt Reaſon to deſire: He offered all that we could aſk, becauſe he engaged to raiſe no Diſturbances himſelf, nor to ſuffer others to raiſe any; which was the very Thing, and the only Thing we deſired; We had no Ends to gain in *Germany*, and therefore we had no Reaſon to wiſh for an Army of *Ruſſians* to act offenſively there: This latter Alliance rendered that as unneceſſary as upon other Accounts it was undeſirable; becauſe the

the Object of the Treaty, the Tranquillity of *Germany* was more effectually ſecured; and all the Deſigns of *France* to embarraſs us in that Quarter entirely baffled. The two Alliances, ſo far from being inconſiſtent, cannot be underſtood unleſs they are taken together, as dependent Parts of the ſame Piece; nor is there any other Difference between them, than between Cauſe and Effect; the former of theſe Alliances was the Medium through which we arrived at the latter.

We had Reaſon to entertain ſome Jealouſy, leſt *France* ſhould raiſe a Storm againſt us in a Quarter where ſhe had formerly much and dangerous Influence: The Engagement with *Ruſſia* was entered into with a View of caſting a Weight into the other Side of the Balance, and of counteracting this Influence: This was its real Deſign, and it had its Effect; when the King of *Pruſſia* ſeeing the Neceſſity of taking pacific Meaſures, offered to enter into Engagements with us, the Purpoſe of the former Alliance was fully anſwered, we had nothing to apprehend in *Germany*, and conſequently it was nothing inconſiſtent with the Subſtance of the *Ruſſian* Treaty to enter into mutual Engagements with his *Pruſſian* Majeſty, to keep Foreigners out of the Empire. Having nothing to fear

ſear from him, nothing could have been more eligible for us. Thus do the idle Ojections to the contradictory Stipulations in theſe Treaties vaniſh of themſelves, the Moment the Deſign comes to be underſtood.

But ſuppoſe that his *Pruſſian* Majeſty ſhould be engaged in Difficulties, which in the preſent Diſpoſition of ſome Courts ſeems not impoſſible; and ſuppoſe that the Court of *Peterſburg* was inclined to march an Army to his Aſſiſtance, which is not indeed ſo probable; but ſhould this be the Caſe, and 'tis the Caſe the Letter-writer ſuppoſes, who then for a Moment can fancy that this Prince would have thought himſelf bound by an Article of a Treaty entered into for his own Advantage, to oppoſe the Progreſs of thoſe Troops, which are marching to his own Aſſiſtance? Or who is ſo ignorant as not to know that this Manner of wording a Treaty cannot at all affect the Subſtance of it, which, like the Subſtance of all Treaties, is for the Benefit of the contracting Powers?

But to return: No Man could in Reaſon ſuppoſe that the Tranquillity of the North and of *Germany* were not as effectually ſecured by theſe Meaſures, as human Wiſdom could ſecure it. And if the Treaty be kept with

with any common Degree of good Faith, we may anſwer for it that our Object is yet ſecure: But if a Power who owed her ſurviving the laſt War, to the Interpoſition of *Great Britain*, ſhould now, in Conjunction with thoſe who in that very War aimed at her utter Ruin, excite Diſturbances in the Empire; and if it be poſſible that, contrary to the Stipulations of a Treaty juſt entered into in Confirmation of a... old Alliance, another Power ſhould ſo far forget all Faith as to be inactive in our Favour, or aſſiſtant to diſtreſs us; this, as it could not be at all foreſeen, ſo is it not at all chargeable to thoſe who adviſed the Treaty; becauſe a Miniſter is anſwerable only for ſuch things as from the Temper and Policy of the Court he engages with, he might have apprehended. But he is not anſwerable for ſuch Breaches of Faith as ſometimes ariſe, not from a political Senſe of their real or ſuppoſed Intereſt, but from perſonal Whims and Caprice, by which Fortune ſometimes overturns the beſt laid and wiſeſt Projects: No Alliance can be built on a firmer Baſis; *nor did any one of thoſe Gentlemen who are ſo fertile in Objections to all that is done, amongſt all their Cavils, once make even a random Gueſs at this*; nor indeed could it be ſuppoſed or ſuſpected with any Colour of Reaſon. In conſequence of the

the same Plan, we were far from rejecting the Alliance offered by the Court of *Berlin*; and if the Pride and false Policy of the Court of *Vienna* made the two Alliances incompatible, there is one Consideration, which above all others ought to have given the Preference to this rather than to an *Austrian* Alliance. Had we engaged with *Austria*, this had infallibly drawn on them a Quarrel with *France*, who would immediately have fallen on *Flanders*; that Part of the World where *France* can make War with the greatest Advantage, where all her Resources are at Hand; where she can attack with the greatest Probability of Success; but where it is difficult, if not impossible, to attack her with any. We should once more have the whole Weight of that unavailing Defence upon our own Shoulders, as we always had; and should find the *Low Countries* the same insatiable Gulph for our Blood and Treasure that we always did.

But now, as *France* has no Pretence for Hostilities upon that Side, she can only act in *Germany* or *Italy*; Countries in which they must struggle with infinite Difficulties, and which have proved fatal to the *French* Arms in almost all Ages.

After all, what mighty Advantages can *France* promiſe herſelf from the Diſcontent of the Queen, or the Meaſures which that Diſcontent gave Birth to? *France* has gained, it muſt be granted, an Ally of great Power; but an Ally which is altogether as heartily diſpoſed to promote the Intereſt of the Houſe of *Bourbon*, as the Houſe of *Bourbon* is diſpoſed to labour ſeriouſly for the Aggrandiſement of the Houſe of *Auſtria*. The only Way in which this Alliance is like to be very laſting, and ſincere is, that both Parties ſhould be very low; for it is impoſſible, with Intereſts ſo very jarring as theirs, that their Succeſſes ſhould not be a great Cauſe of mutual Jealouſies. Where there is ſo much Ambition on both Sides, and ſuch a Rivalſhip as naturally ſubſiſts between theſe Powers, however particular Exigencies may unite them, they can never be much in Earneſt in throwing a great deal of Power into each other's Scale. But allowing the Stability and Cordiality of this Alliance to be never ſo great; if by our joining with *Pruſſia* we have added *Auſtria* to the Strength of *France*, this Junction of *France* and *Auſtria*, ſo ominous to the Liberties of *Germany*, ſhould ſecure us the Friendſhip of the other Princes of the Empire, and will rivet our Alliance with *Pruſſia* beyond all

Power

Power of being moved: So that in whatever Light we conſider our Treaties, they carry evident Marks of Wiſdom; they are the plain Reſult of *one* well digeſted Plan; all of whoſe Parts co-operate in one uniform Deſign; They produce, and they ſupport each other: They are not formed of Parties mutually jealous, nor of Intereſts incompatible; they are the judicious Effects of Choice, and not the bungling Patch-work of Neceſſity.

As a Contraſt to this, it is not unpleaſant to take a View of the Conduct of thoſe who oppoſe and vilify theſe Treaties at home. Firſt, contrary to all Reaſon, they oppoſed all Alliances on the Continent as burthenſome and uſeleſs to us; and now, in a Manner as contrary to *the* plain *Face of* Facts, they complain, *as a great Loſs*, that we have driven all the powerful States of *Europe* from our Alliance; and this they do in the ſame Breath with which they cavil at the Stipulations, which were made in our Treaties with ſoch States as *Muſcovy* and *Pruſſia*. It is true, that inferior uſeful Alliances were cultivated at the ſame Time, and ſurely with great Judgment. The Alliance with *Heſſe*, and the Succours of *Hanover* are no mean

Reinforcement, nor at all inconſiſtent with *the Syſtem of* our other Engagements; and very neceſſary to our Safety here. As to the *merry* Gentleman who has made a *ſerious* Defence of the Miniſtry, if we allow him to have Wit, it is, I ſuppoſe, all he will deſire of us: But if we do allow him this Property, muſt we not at the ſame Time remind him, that in Time of public Danger the Patriot would exert his good Senſe, not his Wit? He would not attempt to make his Countrymen laugh at their Misfortunes, but would teach them to deſerve good Fortune, by unanimouſly purſuing theſe Meaſures that have been contrived for the Good of their Country: When we ſee any one act otherwiſe, muſt we not ſuſpect that he *chuſes to be miſtaken himſelf*, or to deceive others? And knowing that any burleſque Piece does not admit of a ſerious Anſwer, he choſe that Way, of propagating ſuch Notions as might ſerve his own End, hoping he would by ſome, at leaſt, be believed, becauſe the Nature of his Work did not admit he ſhould be anſwered by any Body.

Having thus choſen Allies, whoſe Power might make them effective, and whoſe common Intereſt might keep them ſteady in our Cauſe;

Cauſe; and having diſpoſed the whole ſo judiciouſly that the ſeveral Parts ſupported each other, and in ſuch a Manner that the Efforts of the Enemy muſt only bind them ſtill cloſer, our Buſineſs was to conſider how we ſhould aſſault *France* in ſuch a Manner as might, *in the End*, turn the Balance of the War in our Favour.

When we look over all the Wars which have harraſſed *Europe* for the preceding Centuries, we muſt be convinced that not that Nation, which has had the greateſt Victories, but that Nation which has had the greateſt Reſources prevailed in the End; not that Party which gave the moſt Blows, but that which had the longeſt Breath, came off with Advantage. The Succeſſes in the Field undoubtedly had their Influence; but that Power which could beſt raiſe the Supplies for the enſuing Year had the beſt Chance of dictating in the Treaty of Peace.

To ſay the Truth, in almoſt all the late Wars, all Parties have been near equally exhauſted; they have given out through mere Wearineſs, and failing of the great Purpoſes which they ſought in the Field, have been content with over-reaching each other in ſmaller

ſmaller Matters by the Fineſſes of Negotiation.

Senſible of this, our great Point was to make an early and vigorous Stroke *at the very Heart of Affairs*; not by ſome tranſient Succeſs in the Field, nor even by ſeizing ſome important Fortreſs; for theſe in the End are not deciſive: But ſuch a Stroke as ſhould cut off the Reſources of *France*; and which muſt in the End diſable her from paying Armies, or maintaining Fortreſſes, or by any Means coming into Competition with us in Point of naval Strength. For this Purpoſe we have entirely broke their Trade, we have interrupted their Communication with their Colonies, and we have ſecured upwards of Eight Thouſand of their real acting Seamen, and Five Hundred of their Ships in our Ports. If this ſhould appear but a ſlight Advantage to us, and no material Prejudice to the Enemy, as with other curious Paradoxes has been advanced lately,

I deſire every candid Perſon to conſider, what we, who have ſo much a greater Number of Seamen, and *ſo much* a more extenſive Trade, muſt have ſuffered if we had ſuch a Loſs, and at ſuch a Time: If we do not find it

eaſy

eaſy to raiſe Supplies now, what Difficulties ſhould we have to ſupport then? If now we are puſhed to man our Navy properly, what a Struggle ſhould we have then? If a War in which few Captures have been made, none indeed worth mentioning, has thrown ſome Damp on Credit and on Trade, what a Stagnation of Buſineſs, and almoſt univerſal Bankruptcy would have been produced among us? If a Faction, and the Libellers who ſupport it, have taken ſuch Advantages to ſow Diſcord among us on account of the Loſs of *Minorca*, what had they not ſaid and done in ſuch a Conjuncture to throw us into utter Confuſion?

To know thoroughly how Matters ſtand, put yourſelf into the Enemies Condition, and ſuppoſe him in yours, and then form your Judgment.—Indeed the Loſſes on the one Side will bear no Sort of Compariſon with thoſe on the other. In loſing *Minorca*, it is true, we loſt a very convenient Port, ſituated in ſuch a Manner as to afford us ſignal Advantages in the *Mediterranean*; nor do I mean to extenuate our Misfortunes. It was a conſiderable one, and without Doubt much to be lamented.

But

But let us suppose Matters reversed: Let us suppose, that *Minorca* had been an Island belonging to *France*, and that we had just made ourselves Masters of it; but that *France*, on the other Hand, had secured the very Flower of our Seamen, detained the greater Part of our best trading Ships, plundered us of above a Million of our most valuable Merchandize, and blocked up our Squadrons in our Ports, should we in this Case set the Balance in our Favour? By no Means—Our Party-libellers, whilst they swelled and exaggerated our Losses, far from considering *Minorca* in the Light I have just viewed it, would have found *a perpetual Harvest of Burlesque and Ridicule*, in the Barrenness and Insignificance of that Island; they would have estimated its Produce, they would have calculated its Revenue, they would have compared it with the Expence of reducing and keeping the Place; and far from balancing between that Acquisition and our Losses, they would never have allowed that the Advantages could bear any Proportion to what was expended in the Acquisition.

If they had not acted thus, I appeal to all the Hearers of their Speeches, and the Readers of their Pamphlets, whether they would not

not intirely have altered their Measures, and proceeded in a Spirit wholly different from that which has been employed to *exasperate* our Passions and pervert our Judgments for this Twelvemonth past.

Stating then the Matter between *France* and us: The Loss of *Minorca* though great is not decisive; nor can it much affect the Issue of the War upon the whole. But what *France* has suffered, as it falls directly upon her Trade, must deeply affect the very Issue: As the War continues the Expences encrease, whilst from the great Losses they have had, and those which they have Reason yet to apprehend, the Means of supplying them must diminish in Proportion. A *lamed* Revenue, a shattered Commerce, a People over-taxed, with an internal *Grumbling*, *Discontent*, *and Penury*, are Things mortal to a State, in the Course of a War of any Continuance.

It is but too natural for Mankind to undervalue the Advantages of which they are in Possession, and to over-rate those that fall to the Share of their Rivals and Enemies. But in our Case, nobody, I imagine, could be deceived, unless great Management were

uſed, to carry on the Impoſition. Whilſt the Trade of *France*, and the Revenue, which muſt draw its chief Subſiſtance from that Source, is yet in a more wretched Plight than I have repreſented it, our Ships have ſailed in a Manner unmoleſted through every Part of the Ocean, and reaped as rich a commercial Harveſt as in the ſereneſt Seaſons.

Even ſince the Declaration of War, now upwards of three Months, our Trade in all its Fulneſs, has ſcarce had any Loſs: And even the little we have ſuffered, is far more than repaid by the Prizes we ſtill take from that of *France*, drained and exhauſted as it already is. The trading Part of the Nation methinks ought to underſtand, and to ſhew a proper Senſe of it. If a Trade unmoleſted, a Revenue flouriſhing, and conſequently Reſources abundant, ought to be reckoned as Bleſſings in the Midſt of a War, or the Proof of well laid Deſigns, which Time, that Friend to all wiſe Contrivances, will more and more illuſtrate every Day, if our own Diſcontent, Impatience, and Raſhneſs, with the Arts of ill-deſigning Men, do not make us turn our Backs upon theſe Proſ-

Proſpects, and hinder us from acquiring thoſe valuable Objects we have in View.

What I conſider as a third Part of the Plan of this War, was to provide effectually for our Security at home. How much an Invaſion would have diſconcerted, all our Projects, to ſay no worſe, muſt be obvious; and how much the Accompliſhment of all our Deſigns abroad muſt have depended upon our Security at home, muſt be no leſs obvious. In a Country without Fortifications, where our Capital, our All is but a few Days March from a defenceleſs Seacoaſt; and where the Loſs of one Battle in the Country would have been nearly deciſive againſt us, an Invaſion of all things was what we ought moſt to have dreaded, and beſt to have provided againſt, whilſt *France* had ſuch an immenſe Force hovering over us. We ought not to have ſuffered ourſelves to be laughed out of Apprehenſions ſo juſt. Great Cauſe we had to apprehend an Attempt of this Nature; and indeed the ſlighteſt Cauſes of Apprehenſion ought not to have been deſpiſed when ſo much was at Stake; and I might venture to ſay, that nothing but the wiſe and effectual Precautions that were taken, hin-

dered this Design of *France* from being put in Execution. But it is said, "We ought "to have provided at the same Time for "the Security of all our Dominions, and "not suffer the Limbs to be lopped off "whilst we guarded the Head." This is undoubtedly true: But before we can understand clearly the Nature of this Matter, of how far those who conducted our Affairs are to blame for a Failure in any Part of them, we must take a View of the Situation of our Dominions in *Europe*, compared with those of *France*, and of the Advantage or Prejudice which result to either Party from this Circumstance. The Dominions of *France* consist of one great Tract of Land, compact and entire in itself, not to be attacked in any Part that may not readily be relieved by the Force of the Whole; and that Force is not only always at hand, but very considerable in itself; which makes an Attempt upon any Part of the *French* Dominions in *Europe* one of the most hazardous Undertakings imaginable. But the Dominions of *Great Britain* are disjointed and dispersed: In these Seas they consist of two Countries, divided by the Sea; of which *Great Britain* itself is nothing so compact as *France*, its internal

Force

Force not ſo great, nor ſo central: Another Part of our *European* Dominion lies at the ſouthern Extremity of *Spain*; and a third at a conſiderable Diſtance from that, and at an immenſe Diſtance from *England*, in the *Mediterranean* Sea. But *France* has not only defenſive Advantages which we have not, but her offenſive ones are very great againſt all her Neighbours, and againſt us in particular; for ſhe, as it were, lies between our Dominions, and looks at once into thoſe diſtant Seas in which they lie. She is at hand to attack us in either, whilſt our Force is very far removed from the Defence of one Part: *Minorca* is not above three Days Sail from *Toulon*, it is twenty at leaſt from *Great Britain*.

Theſe Conſiderations will enable us the better to judge, what we had to do when *France* made great Preparations at *Toulon* for a naval Equipment, and the Tranſportation of a Body of Troops, at the ſame time that ſhe prepared another Squadron in the Harbour of *Breſt*, and hovered over our Coaſt with a formidable Army, which overſpread all the Shores of *Picardy*, *Normandy*, and *Bretagne*. At this Time our extenſive Trade employed a great Part of our numerous

rous Fleet to defend it in that perfect Security which by that means it has enjoyed; another Part was abroad, in purſuance of the Scheme to deſtroy that of the Enemy, which never ought to have been relinquiſhed, and in which it acted ſo effectually; and others were ſtationed where particular Exigencies had before required them, too diſtant for a ſudden Recal.

Thus circumſtanced, we had but four Choices to make:

The firſt was to ſend a formidable Fleet to the *Mediterranean*, as ſoon as ever we had Reaſon to ſuſpect the Deſtination of the Armament at *Toulon*, and to have left thereby our own Coaſt naked and defenceleſs, whilſt threatened by ſo great an Army, ſpeedily and eaſily to be landed upon a forſaken Shore.

A ſecond Courſe might have been taken for the Relief of *Minorca*; which was to have kept a good Squadron at home, and deſtined to that Expedition the Fleet which blocked up the Harbour of *Breſt*; from whence a *French* Squadron might ſail to *North America*, or to the *Weſt Indies*, and

attain

attain a great and dangerous Superiority in thoſe intereſting Parts of the World.

A third Method might have been taken, which was to divide what Ships we had fit for Service into three Squadrons; and keeping one at home, deſtine another for *Breſt*, and ſend the third into the *Mediterranean*; and thus, by dividing our Forces, leave ourſelves no effectual Force in any Part.

A fourth Method remained, and this was purſued, which was to let *Minorca* confide in the known Strength of St. *Philip*'s Fort, and the experienced Courage and Fidelity of the Commander, until a Fleet could be got ready, which, without deſtroying the other Parts of the Plan, might baffle that of the *French*, defeat their Fleet, and relieve the Place.

In theſe Circumſtances, which of the four Methods was the moſt eligible? Not according to the Event, but according to probable Appearances at that Time? What had not been ſaid, if ſo egregious and fatal an Error had been committed, as that of leaving the Kingdom expoſed to an Invaſion which threatened it every Moment,

and

and from which we had every ruinous Conſequence to apprehend, to our Lives, our Properties, our Liberties, our Religion, every Thing? How inexcuſable had the Miniſtry been, if, contrary to all juſt Maxims of Policy, they in this Caſe had neglected the *Caput Rerum*?

An Error of this Kind might not improbably have been our laſt, and have left little Difference between the Accuſers and Accuſed, before a *French* Tribunal.

Should we then ſtrip *England* of thoſe wooden Walls, the only Defence which we have been ſo often told ought even to be attempted, rather than defer the Relief of *Mahone* for one Moment after the firſt Rumour that *France* deſigned to attack it?

If we had followed the ſecond Method; and in conſequence of it, the *Breſt* Squadron had ſailed with a great Body of Land Forces to *America*, the Cry had been loud, univerſal; and what would have given it more Force than its Loudneſs or Univerſality, it had been juſt in the higheſt Degree; and no Complaints had been too bitter, no Satires too ſevere, if the Adminiſtration had

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neglected that moſt material Part, the very Object of the War?

As for the third Method, it is too obviouſly weak to ſuppoſe any Perſons whatever could have fallen into it.

What then was left to be choſen but the fourth? For another Choice, I do not ſuppoſe was left, and the three firſt were clearly bad. The fourth then was adopted—No Part of the principal Deſign was relinquiſhed by this; no Advantage was given the Enemy, either on our own Coa[illegible] in *America*, and yet a Force ſtrong enough was ſent, and at a Time early enough; indeed as early as poſſible, conſiſtent with our Ability, with Safety, Honour, or Prudence; a Force that, in the Opinion of all, would have ſecured us the Place, had not the Diſobedience of one Officer (on whom I do not purpoſe to lean, ſince by proper Authority he has ſuffered for it) or the much ſtranger Conduct of another, thrown thoſe Advantages, with which the Vigour and Prudence of the Adminiſtration had armed him, entirely out of our Hands.

If we knew, as a ſimple View of the Plan might have made us know, that Fort *St. Philip*'s was a Place hardly ſecond to any in *Europe* for Strength, and fortified by every Advantage of Nature, and every Con-

trivance of Art; if we know the Nature of the Country of *Minorca*, which laid the Beſiegers under innumerable Difficulties; if we were convinced of the Honour and Capacity of the Governor, what Error was committed in not ſtripping our own Coaſt, to ſend Mr. *Bing*'s Fleet before the middle of *March*, for ſo ſoon was he appointed to the Command, when the *French* Fleet did not *ſail* till the 12th of *April*, did not land before the 18th, nor opened the Trenches, to be afterwards carried on with infinite Difficulty, before the 25th? It is agreed upon all Hands, that Mr. *Bing*, notwithſtanding his Delay here till the 9th of *April*, might have reached *Minorca* on the 5th of *May* with great Eaſe; now what Scheme was ever yet accuſed of Delay, which was calculated to relieve a Place of the moſt immenſe Strength, attacked under ſo many Diſadvantages, ten Days after the Trenches were opened before it? Or ſuppoſing, as the Fact was, that the Relief did not arrive even for fourteen Days after this Time; and that this was foreſeen, which no human Prudence could foreſee, who could blame a Relief as delayed, which ſubjected a Place of ſuch firſt-rate Strength, and at beſt but of ſecondary Conſideration, to a Siege of Twenty-four Days; to ſecure the

the very Being of a Nation, and the moſt valuable Objects of the War? But in reality the Place held out Thirty Days longer than this furtheſt unforeſeen Period of its Relief: And ſuppoſing the Relief ſo contrived as to arrive no earlier than this Period, is it a very extraordinary Preſumption to reckon upon ſuch a Place's holding out only half the Time it was actually maintained? And longer the Fleet even under this Commander could not have been delayed: But that the Fleet performed no effectual Service; that the Place was not relieved, and that the Admiral did not act conformably to his Country's Expectations, is but too true. But what had this to do with the Original Deſign? Certainly nothing.

But why, ſay they, ſhould this Man at all have been employed? Let me in my Turn aſk, why he ſhould not have been employed? Who, of all thoſe Gentlemen who are now grown ſo wiſe by the Event of Things, then objected to him? Why ſhould not he have been employed, who was bred from his Infancy to maritime Affairs, had a Skill undiſputed, a Courage unqueſtioned, and an Honour untainted, till that fatal Day? Who had his own Reputation, the Example of an heroic Father, and

the Honour of a noble Family before his Eyes to excite him to his Duty, in a Command which he himſelf had ſollicited? Had his Sollicitation been rejected; had this Command been given to another, and had he unhappily failed, as this Man has, the Tide of Declamation had run more violently the other Way; and theſe promiſing Circumſtances, which ſeemed to mark him out for playing a noble Part on a Theatre, where his Father had acted ſo gloriouſly, had been ſounded every where to the Diſgrace of a Miniſtry which had the Blindneſs to neglect ſuch an apparent Deſignation. But Objections of the weakeſt Kind are admitted againſt Expeditions which want Succeſs; ſuch is that of Mr. *Byng*'s not having had a ſufficient Force: But it muſt never be allowed, that we ought not to reckon on Mr. *Edgecumbe*'s Squadron as next to certain; for we muſt always reckon that an Officer will do his Duty, as Mr. *Edgecumbe* did his; and that therefore he would in all Probability quit *Mahone* as early as poſſible, to join the Squadron, he muſt have expected, and did expect to ſail to its Relief; But if ten of the ableſt, beſt appointed Ships, that ever ſailed out of *Britain*, with this Reinforcement, are not able to engage with Aſſurance of Succeſs, twelve *French*, foul

ſoul and but indifferently equipped, I do not know what Men can depend upon: It very rarely happens that Matters can be ſo circumſtanced as to aſſure us of meeting the Enemy when we are two to one; an Equality, or a ſmall Superiority, is all that ought reaſonably to be expected; and truly otherwiſe all the great and noble Actions that ever were performed, and that we have been uſed to admire, muſt be accuſed of Folly and Imprudence; *Bravery muſt be termed Fooliſhneſs, Cowardice muſt be called Prudence.*

Tho' I am convinced, and I hope it appears very ſatisfactorily to the Reader, that the Failure of this Expedition is no way imputable to the Miniſtry; yet neither do I think that on the Succeſs or Failure of ſuch a Meaſure, the Event of the War can principally depend.

By adhering ſteadily to the Plan which was laid down, the Enemy is waſted by Degrees, and we may look forward with Confidence, to make *France* yield up *Minorca*, with the reſt of her Encroachments, by the Iſſue of a well conducted War.

No Man indeed can promiſe, if Things ſhould

ſhould entirely change Hands, and other Men, with new and inconſiſtent Deſigns, ſhould make a Babel of the whole of our foreign Schemes, ſtagger our Allies, by the Inſtability of our Meaſures, and confound every internal Arrangement; in ſuch a Caſe, no Man can anſwer for the Event, let the firſt Diſpoſitions have been ever ſo judiciouſly concerted.

Scarce is the Clamour on the Subject of *Mahone* more violent or more unreaſonable, than that which has been raiſed concerning the Conduct of our Affairs in *America*.

That our firſt Efforts there have not been attended with all that Succeſs, which from the general Plan of Operations in that Country, we might have promiſed ourſelves, I am not at all ſurprized.

The *French* have gained over to their Friendſhip and Alliance moſt of the ſavage Nations; and this not owing more to their own Art, and the inconſtant Diſpoſition of that Sort of People, than to the ill Conduct and unwiſe Meaſures purſued by our Countrymen there; at once deſpiſing and provoking the Savages, and thereby forcing them, as it were, into the Arms of *France*,

who

who has reaped all thoſe Advantages which reſult from a perfect Knowledge of the Country, from a Readineſs in harraſſing a Frontier, from Secrecy in marauding Expeditions, and that Dexterity at Surprizes which is the diſtinguiſhing Characteriſtic of every ſavage Nation. They have therefore all the Benefits ariſing from a ſuperior Knowledge of an irregular Warfare; theſe are ever of a more glaring than ſolid Nature; they confound at firſt by their Novelty: The Unwary are ſurprized: But their Succeſſes never diſcompoſe or diſhearten a wiſe Man; for Novelty ſoon wears off; whereas the Advantages of Diſcipline continue and ſtrengthen daily: Every Succeſs which Irregulars of this Sort meet with, is a Prejudice to them in their future Expeditions; they put the Enemy upon their Guard, they familiarize him to ſuch Attacks, and teach him no longer to dread them; while they are themſelves put off their Guard by a Confidence which Succeſs without Diſcipline never fails to inſpire.

Our Troops are by Degrees habituated to the Country, and to the Nature and Manner of the War; our Reſources are large in that Country, and we are taught how to make the beſt Uſe of them. The Strength of the

the *French* is merely in the Savages, whoſe Friendſhip any remarkable ill Succeſs on their Side will be ſure to ſhake. They have a Country not populous enough to recruit Armies, nor fruitful enough to ſubſiſt them for any conſiderable Time; and their Supplies from *Europe* are precarious of themſelves, by Means of a long, troubleſome, and dangerous Navigation, and ſurely little to be depended on while our Fleets are ſuperior.

Our Colonies in *North America* confeſſedly [illegible] a great Superiority over thoſe of *France*, [illegible]nether we conſider the Number of People, the Greatneſs of the Settlements, the Improvement of the Soil, or the Extent of the Trade; but there are Circumſtances too, in which we are much inferior to them. In what relates to carrying on a War with Advantage, in which an Uniformity in Command, in Affections and in Counſels, is of the greateſt Moment. To this Uniformity, from the very Conſtitution of our Colonies, we were a long Time Strangers. Hence aroſe ſome Failures and Delays, ſome Embarraſſements in the Contrivance, and more in the Execution of our Schemes of Operation.

His Majeſty's *American* Dominions conſiſt

ſiſt of a vaſt Tract of Land, divided into a Variety of diſtinct independent Governments; diſtinct not only with regard to the Perſons of their Governors, but differing in the very Forms of their Government: In ſome of which the royal Authority has but little Weight; and in others is but ill aſcertained; in many of which there are internal Jealouſies, the ſeveral Parts that compoſe their Legiſlature being at Variance amongſt themſelves, and in moſt a Jealouſy of their neighbouring Colonies, which makes them frequently regard each other's Proſperity with an evil Eye; add to this, all thoſe unhappy religious Differences which in the Beginning of the laſt Century diſtracted the Mother-Country, ſtill ſubſiſts in that Part of the World, not only ſimply as Sects, but in a manner moulded into their ſevaral Governments, and influencing them not a little. Theſe are Impediments which cannot be immediately and all at once removed, or their ill Effects remedied; and it is ridiculous in the higheſt Degree to charge that as a Crime on the Miniſtry, which aroſe from the natural Circumſtances of the Country itſelf. Whether this Diviſion of Government and Latitude in Religion, permitted or encouraged in the ſeveral Reigns in

which thoſe Colonies were founded, be according to the beſt Ideas of Policy, it is not my Buſineſs to inquire; but it may be thought a little hard, that a Miniſtry of this Day, ſhould bear the Blame of an ill-judged Scheme, contrived and executed an hundred Years before they were born.

Theſe Inconveniences, in the Conſtitution of the Colonies (for ſuch they are at leaſt with Reſpect to the preſent Object) which the preſent Miniſtry neither cauſed, nor could eaſily redreſs, begin already to be leſs felt, and leſs to impede the Deſigns which are carrying on for their common Preſervation. What no Wiſdom perhaps could have done, the Miſeries felt by many, and apprehended by them all, has at length effected. Theſe, have taught them the Neceſſity of laying aſide their Diſputes amongſt themſelves, their Jealouſies of their Neighbours, and their obſtinate religious Prejudices, in favour of the common Safety. Co-operating with the beginning of this happy Diſpoſition, the Miniſtry has ſent over a General of Reputation and Rank; ſeveral excellent Officers under him, and a Body of regular Troops to ſtrengthen and bring into Form the irregular Forces raiſed in that Country.

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The Writer, whom I have ſo often met in my Way before, preſents himſelf here too, and with his uſual *Moderation*, and that *Conſiſtency* and *Juſtneſs of Obſervation* which diſtinguiſhes his Character. He is con nced, that a Body of regular Forces ought to have been ſent on that Service; but no ſooner has he called for theſe Forces, than, finding that they were ſent, he complains heavily of it, and tells you, "Your "fellow Subjects were kidnapped, and ſent "the Lord knows where." Tho' I do not rate this Gentleman's Sagacity quite ſo high as he eſteems it himſelf, yet I believe he is at no great Loſs to gueſs where they were ſent; but this Author is a Man of profeſſed Pleaſantry, and mentions many Things which he knows have no ſort of Force, merely for the Sport of impoſing them on his Readers as ſerious Arguments. This will ſerve as a Key to ſeveral Parts of his Pamphlet, where, in a grave and even ſolemn Manner, he utters the moſt abſurd and ludicrous Things imaginable; and ſparing no Character, not even that which he profeſſes himſelf to honour and admire, he introduces a Letter from Mr. *Blakeney*, written by *the Lord knows who*, and ſent *the Lord knows where or to whom:* For aſſuredly it was never written by Mr. *Blakeney*.

In another Place he is hugely diſpleaſed, that you have ſo ruffled your Enemies, that you have made the politeſt Nation in *Europe* loſe their Temper and Complaiſance, and condeſcend to very low Scurrility; but I think my Countrymen will not ſuppoſe a Miniſter deſerves to loſe his Seat, though he has taken ſuch *uncivil* Meaſures as to make both *France* and *this Letter-writer* downright angry, and equally ſcurrilous. To this curious Complaint he adds another full as curious, that your fellow Subjects were ſeduced by a Promiſe of ſerving at home only. Can he be ſuppoſed ſerious in this? Would it not be the higheſt Abſurdity to ſtipulate with Soldiers where and how they ſhall ſerve, at the Time of their being levied? Can it be believed they ever had ſuch a Promiſe from Authority? Indeed how far the recuiting Officers, or their Serjeants, employed their cuſtomary Addreſs and Oratory, on the Occaſion, I will not venture to affirm. I doubt not but Halberts, Pikes, and even Staffs, have been promiſed to many of the Gentlemen Volunteers; but if the Miniſtry be chargeable for the Breach of all Promiſes made by Serjeants at the Drum-head, or over their Beer, I really think that the honourable Volunteers, who enliſted, and this Gentleman,

their worthy Champion, are in much more comfortable Situations; but, as it muſt be allowed he is an ingenious Man, we cannot ſuppoſe him in Earneſt in this Sort of Objection. His Irony is very nice and bordering on the Obſcure; and People are ſometimes apt to miſtake him: but I will anſwer for it, that a moderate Penſion would induce him to own all he has written to be in that Strain; and I expect, when the Jeſt is diſcovered ſo happily, that he will allow me ſomething out of it, for the Hint.

Of the ſame Claſs is the Objection againſt not ſending my Lord *Loudon* over before thoſe under him in Command. I cannot ſee how this at all ſubjects him to the Commands of his Inferiours. I ſee indeed, that where ſo many Jealouſies ſubſiſt, and where a People, who require to be treated in a very particular Manner are to be dealt with, there might have been certain Circumſtances, certain preparatory Dealings, neceſſary to the principal Deſign, which might probably enough be attended with Miſunderſtandings, Bickerings, and Animoſities: In ſuch a Caſe, ſurely no impoſſible one, the Commander in chief, whoſe Intereſt and Duty require he ſhould be acceptable

ceptable to all Parties, ought to make himſelf as little as poſſible ſubject to the Ill-will of any. Thoſe who went firſt might bear the Brunt of this; and he have the happy Opportunity of reconciling all Men to himſelf, by reconciling them to one another.

This Gentleman is not ſatisfied with wreſting and torturing Facts to anſwer his Purpoſes, whatever theſe Purpoſes are; but when this will not do, rather than fail, he will invent Facts of ſuch a flagrant Nature, that the very Boldneſs of the Falſehood goes a good Way towards making it be thought Truth; becauſe many ſuppoſe, who are unacquainted with the Play of Party, that it is impoſſible any Man ſhould dare to aſſert ſuch Things, if they were not certainly true. The ingenious Author of the Letter to the People of *England* does not ſcruple to affirm, That a ſecret Article of the Peace of *Aix* forbids us to ſend any Ship of the Line into the *Mediterranean*. This indeed is an Article ſo ſecret, that I believe not one of the Parties to that Treaty have heard of it until this Time. I call on the Author to produce any Proof of the Exiſtence of ſuch an Article. If he cannot, as he certainly cannot, for there certainly is no ſuch Article, I muſt beg Leave to remind

mind him, that it is ſome Uſe to a Cauſe to preſerve the Character of ſome ſmall Attachment to Truth; and that he ought to take Care that the good People of *England*, to whom he addreſſes himſelf in the Stile of a Tutor and Guardian, ſhould pay very little Regard to a Man, who is either very *eaſily impoſed on himſelf, or very willing to impoſe on others.*

But Criticiſms of this Sort, without knowing or deſiring to be informed of the real Nature of the Subject we criticiſe, are either not ſerious at all, or they are Things very ſerious indeed.

How exactly do theſe Gentlemen agree with our Enemies the *French* in their Judgment upon our Affairs! The Defeat of General *Braddock* is always in their Mouths, and exaggerated by every Figure which their Stock of Malice and Rhetoric can ſupply them; but the taking the Forts on St. *John's River*, that Part in which *France* feels a Wound moſt ſeverely, and the rather as this diſables her in a good Meaſure from applying a Remedy to thoſe ſhe may receive elſewhere; the driving the *French* from *Bauſejour*, where they held us beſieged as it were in the Peninſula; the more me-

morable Victory of *Johnſon*, attended with the Circumſtance of making the *French* General Priſoner: Theſe are Things they affect to ſlight; the Merit of the two latter Services, is attributed wholly to the People of *New England*; but the Misfortune of the former, is charged wholly on the Miniſtry, though it is well known that all the Operations, thoſe which ſucceeded, as well as thoſe that failed, are Parts of one and the ſame Plan; and conſequently not to be divided, whether we conſider them with Cenſure or Applauſe.

But in whatever Light we view our own Meaſures, the Succeſs the *French* have had is amplified beyond all Truth and Reaſon. What one Step have they advanced, or what material Advantage have they made of the Defeat of *Braddock*? Are they poſſeſſed of any one Place in which they were not eſtabliſhed before that Event? Have they ſuch an Army in the Field as will enable them to act upon the offenſive? And do not even the Incurſions of the *Indians*, Things far enough from deciſive, grow every Day leſs and leſs frequent? Are theſe the Signs of a People who have gained a great and undoubted Superiority? And on our Side, are they Marks of a People neglected

glected and abandoned by their Miniſtry? It is we in Fact that have made the moſt material Advantages, and removed the falſe Land-marks with which the Ambition of *France* had bounded us, even long before the War: we have ſtopped their moſt certain Communication with their Colonies, and we have driven them from Forts of which they had been long in Poſſeſſion; beſides that the Advantages of *France* are paſſing away, whereas ours are daily encreaſing. Our Colonies united, their Diſſentions quieted, and their preſent Concord confirmed and made effective by a good Body of Troops, headed by an unexceptionable Commander, and every Part of our military Operations under a Superintendance which promiſes us every Thing. A People leſs ſanguine than we are, might entertain the greateſt Hopes, if they ſaw their Troops, under ſuch a Direction, from a State of great Rudeneſs become as famous for the Strictneſs of their Diſcipline as they always were for their Courage. If they ſaw the Vigilance of an old Commander united to the lively and active Spirit of Youth; and if they ſaw the ſtricteſt and moſt indefatigable Study in the Art of War, perfecting a Genius, which our Enemies fear and confeſs: I ſay a Genius, becauſe Ex-

perience and Habit, with a moderate Degree of Attention, may make a Man, without any uncommon Capacity, walk with great Credit in the beaten Track of the military Profeſſion; but Genius is the only Star which guides us in the pathleſs Wilderneſs of an unfrequented World. It was a Sagacity of no vulgar Kind which could penetrate at once into the Secret of that new Species of Warfare, to comprehend its peculiar and diſtinguiſhing Character, at the firſt Glance, to enter into the peculiar Difficulties which attended it, and to point out the Rock in this unnavigated Ocean, upon which there was the greateſt Danger of ſplitting. Theſe were Things which our unhappy General there, could learn by Experience only; and in learning which he loſt his Life. Had this unhappy Man behaved with leſs Bravery, and returned with his Life, but without a Conqueſt, we ſhould not have wanted ſome, who amongſt their Murmurs at his ill Succeſs, would not have failed to have attributed his Inactivity to private Orders. As it is, every Thing is miſrepreſented and condemned; the Orders that were given, which, to ſay no more, were certainly juſt and ſenſible, are endeavoured to be made ridiculous; but I ſhall only remind my Reader that this Writer has

has taken up with a Tranſlation of a Tranſlation. His Reaſon for doing ſo is plain. Had he taken the original *Engliſh*, he had miſſed his Aim, and not found it ſo eaſy to ridicule, as would have happened to him in his very ſetting out; for ſmart as he may be on the Words *better Orders*, I will take it on me to ſay, that however the *French* may have tranſlated the Letter they found, and this Writer have taken it from the *French*, yet I ſay in the original *Engliſh* there is nothing to juſtify it. And having thus, in his ſetting out, detected this Writer, it would be paying him too great a Compliment to follow him all through a Piece, wherein, if there was one hundredth Part ſo much Wit as there is ſenſeleſs Ill-Nature, I would recommend it very heartily to the Reading and Rereading of every Man that does read.

When the People are diſpirited, there are never wanting Men of this Kind to make every trivial ill Succeſs of the worſt Conſequence, by impregnating it with Seeds of Diſcord and Confuſion. Thus every Advantage gained by the Enemy is doubled by the Diſſenſion it cauſes at home: A People wanting in a good Opinion of themſelves, and a Confidence in their Rulers, are incapable of any thing great or uſeful.

Thoſe

Thoſe Nations whoſe Character deſtined them for Empire, though full of that high Spirit, which, as it made ill Succeſs unuſual to their Arms, rendered it almoſt inſupportable to their Minds, yet in ſuch a Caſe always grew more enamoured of their Country; and quitting their Connexions with their Party, attached themſelves with ſtricter Bonds than ever, cloſely to the Orders of the State. This they knew was not a Time for Change, becauſe they were ſenſible, that all beginning Adminiſtrations, eſpecially thoſe which owe their Birth to Faction, have two capital Faults; that they are violent, and that they are weak; they were convinced that New Men ſpend that Time in ſearching for Tools, which ought to be employed at Work; and that thoſe who come in upon the Deſtruction of others, hating the Meaſures for the Sake of the Men, fail not to diſturb the moſt ſalutary Regulations made by their Predeceſſors; and that at a critical Seaſon in Politicks, as in Medicine, almoſt every thing depends upon not diſturbing the Order and Method of Affairs.

Theſe, as it is well known, were Principles from which the *Romans* were never known to depart; and it is to thoſe they owed

owed their Grandeur principally, becauſe the weaker they were abroad, the ſtronger and more united they became at home, and Men were encouraged to ſerve their Country with Chearfulneſs, becauſe with Security, both in Peace and in War.

Very different was the Conduct of thoſe giddy Nations whom Providence ſeemed to have marked out for a ſhameful Ruin, and which ſome Patriots would adviſe us to imitate. Incapable of judging but by Events, and impatient of their Condition, but without knowing how to better it, they turned their Backs to the Enemy, and their Arms upon one another. Without conſidering the Situation of Affairs, they expected Impoſſibilities from their Miniſters; they changed them when they were fruſtrated in thoſe Expectations, and choſe new ones, who flattered them with Hopes yet more extravagant, only to deceive them in a Manner yet more fatal, and to make Way for ſuch new Changes as a fickle People never want Pretences to make.

Such were the Manners of the *Athenians* in the baſe and degenerate Times of that Commonwealth; ſuch was the Condition of *France*, when we conquered it; and ſuch

ſuch is the Spirit ſome Men would raiſe in *England*, when *France* is ready to invade us.

But a Miniſtry, ſtrengthened by the Favour of their Prince, and ſupported by the Confidence of the unſeduced and better Part of his Subjects, having done every thing, Prudence could ſuggeſt in a Time of Danger, having ſucceeded in many of the Objects of their Care, and having laid judicious Plans for ſucceeding in the reſt, can never be diſturbed by a Clamour grounded on one Failure, not imputable to them; nor ſuffer by the ill Behaviour of an Officer choſen with every Circumſtance in his Favour. It is our Duty, as Men who love our Country, and are ſolicitous for its Honour and Safety, inſtead of making Uſe of our Loſſes abroad as Inſtruments of Confuſion at home, to turn our Misfortunes to Leſſons; to arm the Hands of our Miniſtry with all the Power of national Union, to correct our Errors and repair our Loſſes. There are no Men, eſpecially thoſe in elevated Stations, whom Malice and Envy working upon Credulity and Ignorance, cannot find Ways to blacken.

FINIS.